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Price Bargaining Without
Supply  Control
Henry W.  Kinnucan
Primary food producers  are permitted to bargain  as a group for higher prices.  Supply
response,  however,  is critical  to the long-run  success of producer cartels.  This article presents
a model  that elucidates that role  of supply  response in agricultural  price  bargaining when  no
overt action is taken to limit quantity  and participation  in the  cartel is voluntary.  Free-riding,
for example,  is  seen as  having a dual nature:  it undermines  the cartel's influence  at the
negotiating  table but it enhances  the cartel's ability to sustain  a negotiated price  increase by
attenuating supply  response.  That  price bargaining  can  result in significant  transfers  from
processors  to producers  when demand  is inelastic  and  supply is uncontrolled  is highlighted  in
the empirical  application.
Price bargaining is  a common feature of American  bargaining  when supply is uncontrolled.  The lack
agriculture,  thanks to  federal  legislation  that  pro-  of supply control is important because it is a salient
tects  agricultural  producers,  including  fishermen,  feature  of agricultural bargaining  structure,  to wit
from antitrust exposure  (Frederick).  Yet the schol-  (French,  p.  17):
arly  literature  is  virtually  devoid  of  studies  that
elucidate the economic effects of agricultural price  Farmer bargaining  associations  are  voluntary
bargaining  in any  systematic  fashion.  Early  work  cooperatives  organized  to  give individual  farm-
by  Helmberger  and  Hoos  remains  the  theoretical  ers  a greater voice  and  (hopefully)  more power
foundation  for the few existing studies  on agricul-  in dealing with what, for most commodities,  is a
tural  price  bargaining  (e.g.,  see  French  and  the  relatively  small  number  of  processor  buyers.
references  cited  therein).  The  Helmberger  and  These  associations  are a type of cartel that con-
Hoos'  model,  however,  treats  buyers  of  agricul-  trols the disposition of the members'  product but
tural  products  as  a  colluding  monopsony,  which  that has no control over the quantity produced.
may overstate  the market power enjoyed  by  mid-  Individual  farmer  members  behave  approxi-
dlemen.  Ladd  extends  Helmberger  and  Hoos's  mately  as  perfect  competitors  in  production,
analysis,  but does not address the long-run effects  i.e.,  they  generally  do  not take  account  of the
of price bargaining,  the major focus  of this paper.  possible  effect of their own output on price  re-
Discussing  noncooperative  game  theory,  Sexton  ceived [italics  added].
identifies  a number of principles (e.g., first-mover
advantage and the importance of patience and out-  This lack of supply control  is beneficial  in that  it
side  options)  that appear  to  apply  to  agricultural  limits  the bargaining  associations'  ability to  exer-
bargaining situations, but assumes that the quantity  cise undue  market  power.'  But it raises questions
sold  is independent  of the bargaining  outcome.  about  the  long-term  effectiveness  of agricultural
The objective of this research is to determine the  bargaining associations  in that any price  increases
price  and  quantity  impacts  of  agricultural  price  obtained by the cartel could easily be dissipated by
the ensuing  production responses,  especially if de-
mand at the farm level is price inelastic.  The prob-
lem of supply response is exacerbated if price bar-
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rests with the author.  Scientific journal paper No.  1-954975  of the  Ala-  Commission has  ruled favorably  on specific  instances in which produc-
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appears  likely  given  the  substitutability  between  supplied  of the  farm  product by  cartel  members,
cartel and  non-cartel  output.  Qs  is the quantity  supplied  of the farm product
This paper explores these issues by developing a  by  non-cartel  members,  Pw is the wholesale price
model that describes the price and quantity impacts  of the processed product,  Pf is the farm product's
of  price  bargaining  in  a  market-equilibrium  set-  market  price,  and PB  is the floor price negotiated
ting.  An advantage of the model is that it side-steps  (or announced)  by the cartel,  which  is assumed to
the  well-known indeterminacy  of the bilateral bar-  reflect  the  supply-inducing  price  for cartel  mem-
gaining solution (Henderson and Quandt, pp. 244-  bers.
49), yet yields testable hypotheses about the role of  In  this model,  PB is assumed to  be  exogenous.
market  supply  and  demand  elasticities  and  free  All inventories  (live and processed)  are assumed to
riding on  cartel effectiveness.2 be  "pipeline"  stocks,  so  changes  in  inventories
The  model's  usefulness  is demonstrated  by  an  associated  with changes  in the floor price are neg-
application  to price-bargaining in the catfish indus-  ligible.  Arbitrage  between  cartel  and  non-cartel
try. The catfish  industry is an insightful case study  producers is disallowed.  That is,  I assume that in-
because  it represents  features common to other ag-  stitutional or practical barriers exist to prevent car-
ricultural  bargaining  situations  (e.g.,  voluntary  tel  members  from  obtaining  non-cartel  output for
membership  in the bargaining  association,  lack of  resale  at the floor price. N and E are demand  and
supply control,  atomistic competition among farm-  supply  elasticities,  respectively,  and  T  is  the
ers,  and  small  number  of processor  buyers,  see  wholesale-farm  price-transmission elasticity.3 L is
Iskow  and  Sexton)  and  data  are  available  to test  a  structural elasticity  that  indicates  the  percent
hypotheses  about cartel  effectiveness.  change  in  the  farm  price  associated  with  a  one
I  begin  by  discussing  the  model.  Hypotheses  percent change in the floor price,  assuming supply
generated  from the model are then tested  via joint  is fixed. L henceforth will be called the  "bargain-
estimation of price-transmission  and demand equa-  ing elasticity."  kB  and  kNB  indicate the proportion
tions.  A key insight from the  analysis  is that  free  of total production that is represented by cartel and
riders,  i.e.,  producers  who  choose not  to partici-  non-cartel members,  respectively.  Given  the  neg-
pate  in  the  cartel  but  benefit  from  any  spillover  ative  sign in  equation (1),  N, E,  T,  and L  are  as-
effects  of the cartel  price  onto  the  market price,  sumed to be positive. However,  because cartel par-
may actually assist the cartel by attenuating  supply  ticipation is voluntary, L is assumed to be less than
response,  the Achilles'  heel of collective  bargain-  one and  will be zero if the cartel  is ineffectual.
ing schemes.  The  price-linkage  equation  (equation  (2))  is  a
quasi-reduced form that describes  the behavior  of
Model  the marketing group,  i.e.,  processors  and the bar-
gaining association  (Hildreth and Jarrett).  That the Consider  the  following  Muth-type  equilibrium-  equation  accurately  depicts  the  relationship  be- equation  accurately  depicts  the relationship  be- ~~displacement  model  ^tween  the wholesale  price and the farm price rests
on the  assumption that  forces  that  cause  the  two
(1)  dln Qd  =  -N  dln P,  (wholesale-level  prices  to  change  (e.g.,  shifts  in  retail demand  or
_,demand)  farm  supply)  exert  their  influences  separately
(2)  dln Pf  = T dln P,  (wholesale-  rather than  in combination  (Gardner,  p.  404).4 If
+ L dln PB  farm price
transmission)
(3)  dln  QB  =  E  dln P,  (cartel supply)  3 A  reviewer  questioned whether  the  supply  elasticities  might  differ
(4)  dln QB  = E dln Pf  (non-cartel  between  cartel  and  noncartel  producers  because,  for  example,  cartel
supply)  members  pay  dues  which  affect  costs.  Although  the  model could  be
Qc  3  B  /  P  ei  . kd  e  modified to  examine  the implications  of heterogenous  supply  response,
(5)  dln Qd  =  kB  din Q 5B  (market-clearing  I avoid this complication primarily because  in the application discussed
+  equilibrium)  later dues  are  negligible,  0.l¢/lb. of product  sold or less  than 0.15%  of
kB  dln  NB  farm  price  on  average.  However,  in  a  different  application  in  which
kNB  dinUs  organizational  costs are  high,  it may be fruitful  to extend the  model  to
permit differential  supply  response.
4 As pointed out by a reviewer,  the  price-transmission elasticity  does
where  Qd  is  the  quantity  demanded  of  the  pro-  not necessarily  have to be positive,  as earlier assumed.  In particular, if
cessed  product  at  wholesale,  Q5B  is  the  quantity  observed changes  in the  farm-wholesale  price  spread are  due strictly to
shifts in the supply schedule for marketing inputs, and if the substitution
elasticity  between  marketing  inputs  (e.g.,  plant  labor)  and  the  farm-
based  input (e.g.,  live catfish)  is  less  than  the absolute  value  of the
2  do  not  wish to trivialize  the indeterminacy  problem.  As  Sexton  wholesale-level  demand  elasticity,  then  T  in  equation  (2)  is  negative
ably argues,  bilateral-bargaining  theory provides useful insights,  despite  (Gardner,  p.  404,  fn.  10).  In  the  more  usual  case  in  which  observed
the multiplicity of equilibria.  It is just that from a longer-run perspective,  margin  changes  are  driven  chiefly  by  shifts  in  farm  supply  or  retail
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this is not the case,  a more complicated form of the  wholesale  price  is  obtained  by  substituting  equa-
price-transmission  equation  may  need to be spec-  tion (6) into (2),  which  yields
ified  (Wohlgenant  and Mullen).
The  market-clearing  mechanism  in  the  model  E (kB  +  kNB  L)I
(N  +  k~N  E T)} dln Ps. may  be  thought  of as  representing  a mixture  of  N  N
goal-  and nongoal-equilibrium  processes  (Chiang,  Equation  (7)  indicates that an  increase in the floor
pp.  35-36).  That is,  in the  closed portion  of the  price always decreases the wholesale price for nor-
market,  an ex  post goal  equilibrium  is  achieved  mal sloping supply and demand curves.  However,
that represents the final outcome of the bargaining  if total  supply  is  fixed,  as  would  be  true  in  the
or "price-signaling"  process.  (Because negotiated  "short run"  (e.g.,  within  one  year  following  the
or announced  prices are  "sticky"  (typically  fixed  increase in the  cartel price for many commodities)
for three months or longer),  and reflect nonmarket  equation  (7)  indicates  that  the  wholesale  price  is
factors  (e.g., negotiating  skill),  it is reasonable to  unaffected by  the floor price.  Thus,  from the pro-
assume that producers regard these prices  as exog-  cessor perspective,  the bargaining association rep-
enous.)  In  the  open portion  of the  market,  a non-  resents  an  unambiguous  threat  to  profit margins,
goal  equilibrium  is achieved  that  reflects  the out-  unless supply  is fixed.
come  of two opposing  forces:  processors  compet-  The effect  of an  increase  in the  floor price  on
ing  in  the  open  (non-cartel)  market  for  the  industry output is obtained by substituting equation
available  (lower-cost)  supply,  and  "seepage"  (7)  into  (1),  which yields
from  the  closed  market  due  to  the  extra  supply
stimulated  by  the  higher cartel  price.  Depending  N  (B  kNB  L) 
upon the relative strengths of the  opposing forces,  (N  +  kN  E T)} din P
the equilibrium farm price consistent with equation  Equation  (8)  indicates  that  so long  as  supply  or
(5) may be higher or lower than the price obtained  demand is not perfectly inelastic,  an increase in the
in a pure nongoal  (market) equilibrium,  floor price  always  increases  industry  output.  The
The effect of a change  in the floor price on the  magnitude  of the  output response  depends  in part
equilibrium farm price  can be determined  by  sub-  on the level of cartel participation.  For example,  if
stituting  equations  (1)-(4)  into  equation  (5)  and  participation  is complete  (kB  =  1.0), the reduced-
solving for dln Pf, which  yields  form coefficient in equation (8) reduces to the sup-
ply  elasticity E,  which  in  general  is  greater  than
(6)  dln Pf =  {(L N - kB E T)/  equation  (8)'s  reduced-form  coefficient.5 Thus,
(N  +  kNB E T)}  dln PB.  theory  predicts  that  the  bargaining  association,  if
successful,  will  enlarge industry  output.
The term in braces  in equation (6)  is the reduced-
form coefficient for  dln PB: it measures the  effect
of an increase in the floor price on farm price after  Free  Riding
taking  into  account  supply  response  and  middle-
men reactions to the floor price.  This effect may be  Returning  to equation  (6) and setting  =  [L N -
positive, zero or negative depending on the relative  (1  kNB)  E T]/(N  +  kNB  E T), the effect of free
magnitudes  of the  two  terms  in  the  numerator of  riding on  the ability  of the bargaining  association
(6). In particular,  for an increase in the floor price  to enhance farm price can be determined by taking
to increase  the farm price,  it must be the  case that  the  partial  derivative  of [  with  respect  to  kNB,
L N >  kB E T.  which  yields:
If  supply  is  fixed  (E  =  0),  the  reduced-form
coefficient in equation  (6) reduces  to the structural  (9)  al/akNB  =  E [TN (1  - L)
parameter L. Thus,  theory predicts that if supply is  + E T2]/(N  +  kNB  E T).
fixed,  an  increase  in  the  floor  price  always  in-  Equation  (9)  indicates  the effect of an  increase  in
creases the farm price,  assuming the floor price is  free  riding  (reduced  cartel  participation)  on  the
effective,  i.e.,  L  #  0.  If supply  is  not  fixed,  the  ability of the cartel to raise farm price.  The sign of
relationship  between  the  floor price  and  the  farm  equation  (9)  depends on the magnitude of the bar-
price  is  indeterminate  without  information  about
the relative magnitudes of the supply  and demand
elasticities,  the bargaining elasticity,  the transmis-  5  To see this,  assume that E > {N E (kB  +  kNB  L)I(N  +  kNB E T)}.
sion elasticity,  and the proportion  of total produc-  with some algebra,  this inequality reduces toN(1 - L)> -E  T, which
tion controlled  by the cartel,  always holds for  normal  sloping supply  and demand  so long  as L <  1.
tion controlled  by the cartel.  (Recall N  is defined to be positive.) Because L is expected to be less than
The effect of an increase in the floor price on the  one, the  original  assumption  holds.122  April 1995  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
gaining elasticity L and will always be positive for  and  to  demonstrate  the  model's usefulness,  I use
L  < 1.  Because  L  in  general  is  expected  to  be  data  for  the  Catfish  Bargaining  Association
between  zero and one,  equation (9)  yields the hy-  (CBA),  which was  formed in 1989  in an effort  to
pothesis  that increases  in free riding  increases the  raise the price received by  catfish producers.
cartel's  price-enhancement  ability.  The  economic  The CBA  operates  in a manner  similar to that
rational for this somewhat surprising result inheres  described by French.  The membership decides  on
in  the  uncontrolled  nature  of supply  response:  as  a price  it thinks  the market will bear given antici-
cartel  membership  increases  (free-riding  de-  pated  market  conditions  and  the  estimated  total
creases)  the proportion of producers responding  to  supply of fish for the contract period.  Prior to July
the  higher  cartel  price  increases,  which  under-  1, 1991,  The Catfish Institute-the producers'  bar-
mines the cartel's price-enhancement  ability.  gaining  representative-negotiated  with  proces-
Note that the foregoing results pertain to a given  sors to secure the desired floor price (Allen). Once
value ofL.  To the extent that L is itself influenced  an  agreement  was  reached,  the  negotiated  price
by  free  riding;  for  example,  by  diminishing  the  floor was announced, which all CBA members and
cartel's  influence  at  the  bargaining  table,  free  affected  processors were  expected to honor. Start-
riding  can  still damage  the cartel's  overall  effec-  ing July 1, 1991,  the CBA abandoned face-to-face
tiveness.  The important point,  however,  is that if  negotiations with processors in favor  of voluntary
the  cartel  does  not  take  steps  to  control  supply  adherence  to  a  "recommended  minimum  price"
response,  free  riders  to  some  extent  serve  this  established  by  association  members.6 The  CBA
function defacto, and thereby enhance the cartel's  makes  no attempt to limit production  or to  assign
effectiveness,  ceteris paribus.  marketing quotas.  Because of escape clauses in the
The relationship L N > kB E T from equation (6)  original contracts  (e.g.,  association  members  with
can be used to define a minimum-effective bargain-  pre-existing production contracts could sell for less
ing elasticity, i.e.,  the  minimum numerical  value  than the floor price and  no minimum-purchase  re-
that L must obtain if the bargaining  association  is  quirements  were imposed on processors),  compli-
to secure  price enhancement  in the face of supply  ance  with  the  negotiated  floor prices  was  essen-
response.  The minimum-effective  bargaining elas-  tially  voluntary,  as  is  the  case  for  the  recom-
ticity  is Lm =  kB  E T / N.  That  the  minimum-  mended minimum price.
effective  bargaining  elasticity  increases,  ceteris  The relationship between CBA's voluntary floor
paribus, with  increases  in cartel  participation  un-  prices  and  the  market  price  is  estimated  jointly
derscores  the dual  nature  of cartel  membership:  a  with  wholesale  demand  via  the  equations  (time
high level of participation  strengthens  the cartel's  subscripts  suppressed):
hand at the negotiating table (which is manifested
by  an increase  in  the ex  ante value  of L),  but  it  (10)  In Pf =  ao + al In Pw + a2 In W
undermines  the  cartel  by  accentuating  supply  re-  +  a3 In PB  + a4 In Pf-1  + u
sponse,  which  raises  the  minimum  value  that  L
must achieve  to render the cartel  effective.  (11)  In Q  = bo  +  bl In Pw + b2 In M
The foregoing model is consistent with the view  + b3 In A  + b4 In Q-
that price bargaining  acts as  a corrective  for infor-  + b  TR+  .i=13  ci Si + 
mation-based  deficiencies  in  the  market  mecha-
nism  (Breimyer,  pp.  129-31).  In particular,  the  where Pf is the pond-bank  price of live catfish; Pw
signaling  aspect  of price  bargaining  may  hasten  is the average wholesale price of processed fish; W
price  discovery,  which  is  akin  to  a  technical  is the minimum-wage  rate (line workers  in catfish
change that shifts  the supply  schedule  for market-  processing  plants  tend  to  be  paid  at  or  slightly
ing inputs down. A downward shift in the  market-  above  the  minimum  wage);  PB  is the  announced
ing-inputs'  supply  schedule in  general  will cause  floor price in force during period t;
7 Q is the total
the farm price to rise and/or the wholesale price to  quantity of catfish  sold by U.S. processing  plants;
fall (e.g.,  see Kinnucan and Nelson). The model  is  M is the total U.S.  imports of processed catfish; A
also consistent  with Bunje's assertion  (p.  37)  that
"... bargaining  cannot overcome the law of sup-
ply and demand."  6 According to Allen, the switch from formal  contracts to "jaw bon-
ing"  occurred in response to large supplies of fish that had accumulated
following the  original  series of contracts,  a telling point.
Application  7  The announced floor price is  defined to be greater than or  equal to
the market  price.  So prior to November  1989 and for several  months in
A  key  parameter  in  the  analytical  model  is  the  1991  and  1993  when  the floor  price  was permitted  to  "float"  or  the
bA  rKgaey  pamelterinth  aticat  t  elastt  market price  moved above  the  negotiated  price,  the floor price  was set
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is total industry expenditures  on advertising;  TR is  Table  1.  Comparison  of the CBA Floor Price
a trend variable  (TRt =  3, 4,  ... ,96 for March  and the Market Price for Catfish,  1989-93
1986 through December 1993) that reflects normal
demand growth associated with a new product (per  Floor  Market
capital  catfish  consumption  increased  tenfold  be-  Price  Price  Difference
tween  1980  and  1993);  Si are  quarterly  dummy  Date  --------------  /lb.  --------------
variables;  and  u  and  v  are  random  disturbance  November 1989  70  64  6
terms.  All  money-denominated  variables  in  the  January  1990  75  68  7
model  are  deflated  by  the  Consumer  Price  Index  March  1990  80  78  2
l(1967  =  100).  December  1990  75  72  3
(1967  =  100).  April  1991  70  69  1
Equation  (10)  is  similar  to  the  price-trans-  July  1991  63  63  0
mission  equation  specified  by  Zidack,  Kinnucan  February  1992  58  56  2
and Hatch except that it is expressed in logarithmic  March  1992  65  60  5
rather than  linear form  and  the farm  price  rather  Febrary  1993  70  67  3 October  1993  75  73  2
than the wholesale price appears  as the dependent  1989-93 Average  70.1  67.0  3.1
variable.  The  logarithmic  specification  was  se-
lected  because  recent  analysis  by  Nyankori  sug-
gests this form fits the  data better than the  linear  intervention  (1986.3-89.10)  and four  years of in-
form. The farm price is specified  as the dependent  tervention  (1989.11-93.12).9  The first  two obser-
variable to permit a direct test of whether the struc-  vations  are lost due  to the presence  of the lagged
tural  elasticity  defining  the  relationship  between  dependent variable in the empirical  model and  the
the announced  floor price  and the  market price is  estimation procedure  to be discussed later.
indeed nonzero.  The price and quantity  data for catfish were  ob-
Equation  (11)  is  similar  to  the  wholesale  de-  taied from Tables  11,  12,  14 and  17 of USDA's
mand equation estimated by Zidack, Kinnucan and  Aquaculture Situation and Outlook Report. Data
Hatch  except  that  income  is  omitted  from  the  for the  CPI  and  the  minimum  wages  rates  were
model and  advertising  is expressed  as  contempo-  obtained from the Statistical  Abstract of the United
raneous rather than lagged four months.  Income  is  States and the Bureau  of Labor Statistics  Detailed
omitted  because  Zidack,  Kinnucan,  and  Hatch  CPI Report.  The advertising  data  were  obtained CPI Report.  The  advertising  data  were  obtained
found  it  to  be  insignificant.  Advertising  is  ex-  from the  advertising  agency  handling the  account
pressed  without  a  lag  under  the  hypothesis  that  for The  Catfish  Institute,  the  industry  marketing
consumer delay in responding to changes in adver-  organization  responsible  for  advertising  and  pro-
tising expenditures  is less  likely now  that the  ad-  ducer  price  negotiations  over the  sample  period.
vertising program has been in force for seven years  These  data are actual,  not budgeted,  expenditures
(since  April  1987).8 Following  Zidack,  Kinnucan  for catfish ads in all media,  chiefly magazines  and
and  Hatch  a marketing  cost variable  is  excluded  radio
from  equation  (11),  which  is  a  derived-demand  The data on the announced floor price were ob-
equation,  because  previous  analysis  indicated  it  tained from various issues of The Catfish Journal,
was  non-significant.  which  reported  the  negotiated  or  "recommended
That  an  increase  in  the  negotiated  (or  an-  minimum"  price  and  its  effective  duration.  The
nounced) floor price causes an increase in the farm  announced  floor price and the market price of cat-
price  is tested  by forming  the hypothesis:  fish at the time in which  the announced  price was
(12a)  HN: a3 =  0  to go into  effect are reported  in Table 1. Since its
(12b)  HA:  a 3 > 0  inception,  the  CBA  on  average  has  negotiated  a
price that was 3.1  cents per pound higher than the
Hypothesis  (12) represents  a one-tail  test that  can  contemporaneous  market  price,  a  4.6% nominal
be tested with  a standard  t-statistic.  increase  over  the  average  market  price  for  the
1989-93  period.
Data and Estimation Procedure  Owing to zero observations for advertising,  one
dollar  was  added  to  each  monthly  observation
The model  was estimated  with 94 monthly  obser-  (zero and non-zero values  alike) after deflation to
vations  covering  about  four  years  of  CBA  non-
9 The  data  period  starts  in  1986  to  reflect  USDA's  more  uniform
8 Note that the model still permits advertising carryover via the lagged  reporting of price and quantity  data beginning January  1986,  especially
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permit taking logarithms. Because the average  un-  Table 2.  3SLS  Estimates of Catfish Demand
deflated monthly expenditure during periods of ad-  and Price-Transmission Equations,  March
vertising  was about $125,000,  this adjustment has  1986-December  1993  Data
a minuscule effect on raw  data values.
The wholesale  price and imports are determined  Variable  Catfish Demand  Price Transmission
simultaneously  with  the farm  price  and  domestic  Constant  6.019  (7.53)a  -0.765  (-2.41)
quantity,  thus  equations  (10)  and  (11)  contain  in Q_  0.419  (6.39) 
right-hand  side  variables  that  are  endogenous.  InPw  -0.184  (-1.83)  0.308  (2.55)
Moreover,  the disturbances  in  the  two  equations  n M  -0.0020  (-0.09) 
are  likely to be correlated.  Therefore,  I estimated  n A  0.00383  (4.83)
In Pf-1  - 0.250  (3.09) the  model  as  a  system  using  3SLS.  The  instru-  In W  -0 0077 (-015)
ments  included  the  predetermined  variables  in  in  P  - 0.595  (10.16)
equations  (10)  and  (11)  plus the  lagged values  of  TR  0.0041  (6.84)  -
Pw and M.  S,  0.187  (11.90)  -
Prior to estimation  by  3SLS,  I tested  the  equa-  S2  0035  (2.04) S 3 0.067  (3.67)  -
tions for  serial  correlation using  Durbin's  m  test,  R2 0.950  0.983
the preferred test statistic for equations that contain  pb  -0.024  0.632
lagged dependent variables  (Kmenta, pp. 333-34).
l  pp.  33 3i  •34  ..  '  •  i  Numbers in parentheses are  asymptotic t-ratios.
The  hypothesis  of  first-order  serial  correlation  bAutocorrelation  coefficient  prior to  adjustment for serial  cor-
could be rejected for the demand equation, but not  relation.  The price  transmission equation  was corrected for se-
for  the  price-transmission  equation.  Thus,  the  rial correlation  using Hatanaka's  two-step  procedure.
price-transmission  equation  was  corrected  for  se-
rial  correlation  using Hatanaka's  two-step  proce-
dure in  LIMDEP  (Greene,  pp.  274-75  and  411).  which  suggests  that  catfish  demand  is  subject  to
Unless  stated  otherwise,  hypothesis  testing  is  seasonal  shifts  and is  highest in the  first calendar
based on a t-test at the  5%  probability  level.  quarter (Lenten period).  Trend is positive and sig-
nificant,  which suggests  that  catfish  is still  in the
growth  phase  of the product life  cycle  (e.g.,  see
Estimation Results  Zidack,  Kinnucan  and  Hatch).
Turning to  the price-transmission  equation,  the
Estimation results  in general  are  satisfactory  (Ta-  estimated  (long-run)  wholesale-farm  price  trans-
ble 2). The R2's of 0.95 and 0.98 suggest the equa-  mission  elasticity  is  0.41.  This  suggests  that  the
tions  provide  a  good fit  to  the data.  Most of the  farm price is relatively insensitive to changes in the
estimated coefficients  have  the expected  sign and  wholesale price,  which may reflect processor mar-
are significant.  The lagged  dependent variables  in  ket power (e.g.,  Kinnucan and  Sullivan).  The la-
both  equations  are  significant  at the  1%  level  or  bor cost variable  is not significant,  contrary to ex-
lower  and the  estimated  coefficients  lie  between  pectations.
zero and  one,  as required  to  satisfy  stability con-  The  key  policy  variable,  the  announced  floor
ditions.  price,  is positive and highly  significant  (t-ratio of
The  estimated  long-run  demand  elasticity,  10).  The estimated  short- and long-run  elasticities
which is obtained by  dividing the wholesale-price  are,  respectively,  0.60 and 0.80. These elasticities
coefficient  by  one  minus  the  coefficient  of  the  imply  that  if the  announced  floor price  increases
lagged  dependent  variable,  is  -0.32.  Zidack,  1%,  and  supply  is fixed,  the  farm  price  can  be
Kinnucan,  and Hatch's estimate was  - 1.01  based  expected to  increase 0.6% immediately  and 0.8%
on  1980-89  data  and  Kinnucan  et al.'s estimate  after sufficient  time has elapsed for the farm price
was  -1.54  based  on  1980-83  data.  The smaller  to adjust fully to a change in the announced floor
elasticities  in the more recent periods  indicate that  price.  Thus, the hypothesis that the CBA has had a
catfish  demand is becoming less elastic  over time.  favorable impact on the market price of live catfish
The estimated long-run  advertising  elasticity of  is supported by the  data.
0.0066 is close to Zidack,  Kinnucan,  and Hatch's  Recall from the earlier  discussion  that the con-
estimate  of 0.0075.  The insignificance  of the im-  dition L N > kB E T must obtain if an  increase  in
ports variable may reflect the declining importance  the floor price  is to increase  the farm price  when
of imports  as a supply source in U.S.  markets.  (In  supply response  is permitted.  Substituting  the em-
recent years,  catfish  imports have declined  to less  pirical estimates of L  =  0.80, T = 0.41,  and N =
than  2% of processor  sales.)  .32  into  this expression,  and  setting  the producer
The  seasonal  dummy  variables  are  significant,  sign-up parameter  kB equal to 0.80 (an estimate ofKinnucan  Price Bargaining  Without Supply Control  125
Table  3.  Model Parameters and Baseline  (1993)  Values,  U.S.  Catfish Industry
Item  Definition  Value
Model Parameters:
L  CBA Bargaining  Elasticity  0.80
T  Wholesale-Farm  Price  Transmission  Elasticity  0.41
N  Wholesale-level  Demand Elasticity  0.32
E  Farm-level Supply Elasticity  0.15,  0.58
kB  Production controlled  by  CBA (prop.  of total)  0.50,  0.80
din PB  Percent change  in CBA price/100  0.0442
Baseline Values:
Pf  Farm Price ($/lb.)  0.71
Qf  Liveweight  Quantity  (mil.  Ibs.)  459.0
Pw  Wholesale  Price ($/lb.)  2.19
Qw  Processed Quantity  (mil.  Ibs.)  233.5
the upper bound of participation over the  1989-93  price augmentation,  2.82%,  occurs when supply is
period) yields the inequality E < 0.78.  This means  relatively  unresponsive  to  price  (E  =  0.15)  and
that  the  supply  elasticity  for  catfish  must  be less  CBA  participation  is relatively  low  (kB  =  0.50).
than 0.78 for the CBA to be effective at raising the  When  supply  is relatively  elastic  (E  =  0.58)  and
farm  price  without  overt  supply  control.  If pro-  participation  is high (kB  = 0.80),  the increase  in
ducer  participation  drops  to  50%,  the  minimum-  farm price is reduced to 0.78%.  Overall, it appears
effective supply elasticity  increases to  1.25.  These  that  compared  to the  supply  elasticity,  results  are
results,  which  quantify  the  relationship  between  relatively  insensitive  to CBA  participation.  Thus,
free riding  and  supply  response discussed  earlier,  for the parameter  values indicated  in Table 3,  car-
suggest that catfish supply may be relatively price  tel participation has  a minor effect  on rent dissipa-
inelastic for the CBA to extract sustained benefits  tion (to be  discussed later).
for producers.  Simulated  CBA  impacts  on the  wholesale  price
range  from  -1.69%  to  -6.66% and  are  largest
when  producer participation  is high and  supply  is
Simulation  relatively elastic.  Moreover, these price impacts  in
every case exceed  the quantity  impacts,  which  in-
An  estimate  of the actual  CBA-based  benefits  to  dicates  that the  announced price  floor causes  a re-
producers-and  the corresponding  costs  to proces-  duction  in  processor  revenues.  That is,  the  esti-
sors-can be determined  by  simulating  equations  mated  CBA-induced  increases  in  quantity,  which
(6)-(8) utilizing elasticity  estimates obtained from  range  from  0.54%  to  2.13%,  are  not  sufficiently
the econometric model and assumed values for the  large  to  compensate  for  reductions  in  processor
supply  elasticity  as  indicated  in Table  3.  Zidack,  price.  Overall,  supply response  is seen  as  attenu-
Kinnucan and Hatch estimate a catfish supply elas-  ating the CBA effect on farm price and accentuat-
ticity of 0.15; Branch and  Tilley estimate  a  "har-  ing the  CBA effect  on wholesale  price.
vest response"  elasticity  of 0.58.  Both  estimates  One  way to gauge  the relative CBA  impacts  on
are used in the simulations  to gauge  the sensitivity  producers  and processors  is to measure  the associ-
of results to supply  response.  In addition,  the pro-
portion of total pond production  controlled by the
CBA is set alternatively to 0.50 and 0.80 to assess  Table  4.  Simulated  Effects  of a  4.42% (3.1
the importance of this parameter to model results.  0/lb.)  Increase in the Announced  CBA  Price
These values  appear to represent  the range of par-  for Alternative Values  of the Supply Elasticity
ticipation  enjoyed by  the  CBA since  its inception  (E)  and CBA  Participation (kB)
in 1989.  The percent change in the floor price is set E = 0.15  E =  0.58
equal  to 4.42%,  the  average  percent  change  over  _____  ___
the  1989-93  period.  k  =  kB  =  kB  =  kB  =
Results  indicate  that  the  announced  floor price  Variable  0.50  0.80  0.50  0.80
always  increases  the farm  price for the  parameter  -------------------- %  change  -----------------------
values  in  Table  3,  but  that  the  magnitude  of the  dlnPf  2.82  2.74  1.37  0.78
price increase  is sensitive to the CBA participation  din P  -1.69  -1.91  -5.23  -6.66
rate  and  supply  response  (Table  4).  The  largest  dlnQ  054  0.61  1.67  2.13126  April 1995  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
ated  changes  in  producer  surplus  (quasi-rent)  at  rangements  in agriculture.  In the case  of the Cat-
each market level. For this purpose,  I set kB equal  fish Bargaining  Association,  producers  elected  to
to  0.50  and  simulated  the  model  for  alternative  elevate price  above  prevailing  market prices,  but
values  of  the  supply  and  demand  elasticities  as  failed to take corresponding  action to limit supply.
indicated in Table 5. Looking first at the effects for  The  inevitable  increases  in  supply that  are  stimu-
N  =  0.32,  results  indicate  that if supply  is rela-  lated by effective price floors undermine the ability
tively  inelastic  (E  =  0.15),  the increase  in  pro-  of  agricultural  bargaining  associations  to  sustain
ducer surplus at the farm level exceeds  the reduc-  meaningful  price  enhancement  for  any  length  of
tion  in  producer  surplus  at  the  wholesale  level,  time.  Fortunately  for  the  CBA  and  its  producer
resulting  in a slight  net gain for  the industry  as  a  members,  however,  catfish  supply  is  sufficiently
whole.  However,  if supply is relatively  elastic  (E  price inelastic to render collective  action effective,
=  0.58),  processing-sector  losses  exceed  farm  at  least  for the  modest  increases  in  market  price
gains by  nearly 6:1.  induced  by the cartel  thus far.
If the demand  elasticity  is increased  from 0.32  The  econometric  estimates  suggest  that  about
to  unity,  the elasticity  estimated  in earlier  work,  80%  of the  increase  in the  announced  CBA-floor
the  adverse  effects  of  a  relatively  elastic  supply  price appears as an increase in the farm price when
response  are  attenuated  but  processor  losses  still  supply  is  fixed.  Given  that  CBA  participation
outweigh  producer  gains  (Table 5).  If the  supply  never represented more  than 80%  of total produc-
elasticity  is reduced  to E  = 0.15  and  demand  is  tion and probably averaged  closer to 55%  over the
unitary elastic, processor losses  are relatively mod-  1989-93  period  (Allen),  this  suggests  that  CBA
est  compared to producer gains.  The incidence of  price-enhancement  extended  beyond  cartel  mem-
bargaining  association  impacts,  therefore,  is  sen-  bership.  This does not necessarily  mean, however,
sitive  to  supply  and  demand  elasticities.  In  this  that non-participants  are free riders in the ordinary
application,  net gains  to  the industry  as  a whole  sense of the term. As revealed by the comparative-
(producers and processors) are largest when supply  static model,  free-riding  serves the important eco-
is relatively inelastic and demand is relatively  elas-  nomic function of limiting the supply increases as-
tic.  Given  my  "best  guess"  supply  and  demand  sociated with the cartel price. Thus,  enlarging  car-
elasticities  (E =  0.15  and N  = 0.32),  it appears  tel  participation  does  not  necessarily  enhance  a
that  CBA-induced  gains  to  producers  have  been  cartel's effectiveness  when supply is uncontrolled.
modest  ($9.23  million  in  1993)  and  sufficient  to  Apart  from  any  potential  losses  to  consumers,
offset losses to processors.  the  clear  losers  in  this  producer-cartel  pricing
scheme are processors.  According  to my analysis,
processors  always  lose  from  successful  producer
Concluding Comments  bargaining,  unless supply is unresponsive  to price.
For the parameter values that  appear to govern  the
e m  r  t  e  f ts  p  r  is tht s  r  catfish industry  in recent years,  the simulation re- The  major theme  of this paper  is that  supply  re-  indicate  that  the  CA  at  t  i  a  r
sponse  is critical  to  the  success  of cartel-like  ar-  ts  init  t  the  CBA  at  bt  is  abreak- even proposition for the industry  as  a whole,  and
may  have  resulted  in  significant  transfers  from
Table 5.  Incidence  of CBA  on  Producer  processors  to producers.'  Thus,  to the extent that
Surplus at Farm and Wholesale  for  producers  have ownership  interest  in the process-
Alternative  Values  of the Demand Elasticity  ing sector through cooperatives  or vertical integra-
(N) and Supply Elasticity  (E)  tion,  the net gain to producers  is ambiguous.  Still,
my  results  overall  suggest  that  price  bargaining
N = 0.32  N  =  1.00  associations  can be effective  at enhancing farm in-
Variable  E = 0.15  E =  0.58  E =  0.15  E =  0.58  come-provided supply is sufficiently price inelas-
tic to  limit the  increases  in  output that  inevitably
------------  million dollars  --------  - flow from price-enhancement  endeavors in a com-
d PSI 9.23  4.51  10.73  8.82
d PS,  -8.68  -27.00  - 2.96  - 10.61  p  industry
ad PS represents the change in producer surplus.  It is calculated
using the basic formula d PS = dln P P* Q* (1 + 0.5 dln  Q)
where P* and Q* are the initial equilibrium values  of price and  This  conjecture is consistent with the fact that Delta Pride,  a major
quantity reported in Table  3. The sign-up parameter kB is set to  processor and a producer-owned cooperative,  required "paybacks"  from
0.50 in these  simulations.  Note: the  annual cost of running the  farmers  to  cover  operating  losses  sustained  following  the  signing  of
CBA was about $150,000  (Allen).  contracts in 1989-91.Kinnucan  Price  Bargaining Without Supply  Control  127
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